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Local, national, and regional viral haemorrhagic fever 
pandemic potential in Africa: a multistage analysis
David M Pigott, Aniruddha Deshpande, Ian Letourneau, Chloe Morozoff, Robert C Reiner Jr, Moritz U G Kraemer, Shannon E Brent, Isaac I Bogoch, 
Kamran Khan, Molly H Biehl, Roy Burstein, Lucas Earl, Nancy Fullman, Jane P Messina, Adrian Q N Mylne, Catherine L Moyes, Freya M Shearer, 
Samir Bhatt, Oliver J Brady, Peter W Gething, Daniel J Weiss, Andrew J Tatem, Luke Caley, Tom De Groeve, Luca Vernaccini, Nick Golding, 
Peter Horby, Jens H Kuhn, Sandra J Laney, Edmond Ng, Peter Piot, Osman Sankoh, Christopher J L Murray, Simon I Hay
Summary
Background Predicting when and where pathogens will emerge is difficult, yet, as shown by the recent Ebola and Zika 
epidemics, effective and timely responses are key. It is therefore crucial to transition from reactive to proactive 
responses for these pathogens. To better identify priorities for outbreak mitigation and prevention, we developed a 
cohesive framework combining disparate methods and data sources, and assessed subnational pandemic potential 
for four viral haemorrhagic fevers in Africa, Crimean–Congo haemorrhagic fever, Ebola virus disease, Lassa fever, 
and Marburg virus disease.
Methods In this multistage analysis, we quantified three stages underlying the potential of widespread viral 
haemorrhagic fever epidemics. Environmental suitability maps were used to define stage 1, index-case potential, 
which assesses populations at risk of infection due to spillover from zoonotic hosts or vectors, identifying where 
index cases could present. Stage 2, outbreak potential, iterates upon an existing framework, the Index for Risk 
Management, to measure potential for secondary spread in people within specific communities. For stage 3, epidemic 
potential, we combined local and international scale connectivity assessments with stage 2 to evaluate possible spread 
of local outbreaks nationally, regionally, and internationally.
Findings We found epidemic potential to vary within Africa, with regions where viral haemorrhagic fever outbreaks 
have previously occurred (eg, western Africa) and areas currently considered non-endemic (eg, Cameroon and 
Ethiopia) both ranking highly. Tracking transitions between stages showed how an index case can escalate into a 
widespread epidemic in the absence of intervention (eg, Nigeria and Guinea). Our analysis showed Chad, Somalia, 
and South Sudan to be highly susceptible to any outbreak at subnational levels.
Interpretation Our analysis provides a unified assessment of potential epidemic trajectories, with the aim of allowing 
national and international agencies to pre-emptively evaluate needs and target resources. Within each country, our 
framework identifies at-risk subnational locations in which to improve surveillance, diagnostic capabilities, and 
health systems in parallel with the design of policies for optimal responses at each stage. In conjunction with 
pandemic preparedness activities, assessments such as ours can identify regions where needs and provisions do not 
align, and thus should be targeted for future strengthening and support.
Funding Paul G Allen Family Foundation, Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, Wellcome Trust, UK Department for 
International Development.
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Introduction
The Ebola virus disease outbreak, which centred in 
Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, was unprecedented 
both in terms of mortality and morbidity, as well as the 
extent to which the disease spread locally and 
internationally.1 The unanticipated cases of Ebola virus 
disease in regions previously considered non-endemic, 
coupled with inadequate infrastructure and susceptible, 
yet highly mobile populations, might have contributed to 
the outbreak infecting over 60 times more individuals 
than any previous Ebola virus disease outbreak.2 As 
pathogens continue to emerge and spread into populations 
at-risk, a move from purely responsive activities to also 
include proactive management of emerging infectious 
diseases is urgently needed.3,4 The current paradigm of 
responding to these threats as and when they arise is 
expensive and unsustainable.5 Initiatives such as the 
Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations and the 
US Global Health Security Agenda, with its renewed focus 
on achieving the International Health Regulations, have 
reinforced a need for a proactive approach to emerging 
infectious diseases.6 Consequently, there is great interest 
in the development of tools to help pre-empt such 
outbreaks and inform broad-scale health-system 
strengthening with respect to emerging infectious 
diseases,7,8 and particularly, to establish the prioritisation 
of limited resources9 and the optimal deployment of 
surveillance, preventive measures, and treatments.
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sihay@uw.eduSeveral studies have identified pathogens with 
pandemic potential and key drivers of their distribution 
and emergence,10,11 as well as defined vulnerable 
countries.12 Further, various methods and technologies 
can be used once cases are reported, aiding the response, 
tracking, and predicting progression from an index case 
to widespread epidemic.13–16 However, few systems are in 
place to synthesise these disparate analyses in a 
consolidated framework that outlines this potential 
progression,17,18 and no work to date, to our knowledge, 
accounts for subnational variations that more closely 
reflect the geographic level at which outbreaks occur.
Viral haemorrhagic fevers, such as Crimean–Congo 
haemorr hagic fever, Ebola virus disease, Lassa fever, and 
Marburg virus disease, are present in Africa and have the 
potential for secondary human-to-human transmission 
after zoonotic spillover into human populations, with 
initial clinical presentation similar to several other 
pathogens. Subsequently, they pose a risk to populations 
in both endemic and non-endemic locations, particularly 
where rapid diagnostic capacity is low.19
To assess the ability of these pathogens to cause a 
widespread epidemic, we developed a framework that 
focuses on key transition points in a potential outbreak. 
By addressing different stages of an epidemic, we aim to 
provide actionable information on where to focus existing 
countermeasures. Additionally, by using a subnational 
unit of reference, we aim to provide information at a scale 
comparable to the localised nature of outbreaks, allowing 
for identification of communities at greatest risk. Drawing 
from multiple data sources and methods, this study 
outlines a three-stage framework (figure 1): stage 1, index-
case potential, describes the transition (spillover) from 
zoonotic reservoirs or vectors into human populations, 
resulting in an index case (ie, the first case in any potential 
epidemic); stage 2, outbreak potential, characterises the 
subsequent secondary spread of the pathogen in people, 
typically localised where care is given, whether at home or 
in the health-care system and nearby settlements; stage 3, 
epidemic potential, describes the processes by which local 
outbreaks can subsequently cause infections elsewhere 
nationally, regionally, and internationally.
Methods
Overview
In this multistage analysis, we characterised three stages 
of a potential viral haemorrhagic fever outbreak with a 
variety of methods and datasets (table). We used 
Research in context
Evidence before this study
We searched PubMed with search terms “viral haemorrhagic 
fever preparedness”, “viral haemorrhagic fever risk assessment”, 
“pandemic risk assessment”, and “pandemic preparedness”, for 
articles published between Jan 1, 1990, and July 1, 2016, with 
supplemental searches in Google Scholar. Articles assessing 
subnational variation in pandemic risk or evaluating this risk 
across broad geographic scales were included. A variety of 
analytical approaches have been developed to assess different 
aspects of outbreak risk, including environmental correlates to 
define regions of possible pathogen emergence, models of 
population connectivity to determine potential spread, and 
analyses of drivers of incidence and prevalence at local and 
national levels. Most of these assessments are retrospective, 
or delayed due to time lags in data availability and hence may 
have limited utility for improving epidemic preparedness. 
Pre-emptive assessments of epidemics, leveraging common 
features from such work are less common. Hotspots of disease 
emergence have been identified and indices developed to 
gauge national-level susceptibility to infectious pathogens, 
representing important first steps in assessing risk. To date, 
however, no analyses have quantified how these vulnerabilities 
might change during different stages of an outbreak, nor have 
they consistently evaluated such vulnerabilities for the spatial 
granularity at which outbreaks occur and are addressed.
Added value of this study
This study builds upon previous preparedness concepts to 
develop a subnational evaluation of epidemic potential across 
Africa. For the first time, within a single pandemic potential 
framework, our analyses show how different stages of an 
outbreak can be quantified and evaluated before the next 
outbreak. We use a new combination of methods to provide 
a complete picture of potential outbreak progression, 
from initial spillover resulting in an index case to broader 
regional and international spread; thus allowing countries to 
directly focus on places where disease emergence and 
subsequent transmission could have the greatest impact on 
human health.
Implications of all the available evidence
Our results allow both governmental and non-governmental 
organisations to better understand epidemic potential, and 
offer pre-emptive planning to address vulnerabilities before 
the next outbreak of viral haemorrhagic fever. Using these 
results in tandem with existing in-country evaluations, such 
as the Joint External Evaluations, allows stakeholders to 
establish whether outbreak preparedness activities, broader 
governmental initiatives, or pathogen-specific control 
measures, are being targeted appropriately to places with 
future outbreak potential. Regions where there is a mismatch 
between pandemic potential and existing preparedness 
activities should therefore be considered as priorities in future 
preparedness planning. By moving preparedness discussions 
from national to subnational assessments, outbreak response 
protocols can better reflect the demands that epidemics 
present to local health systems.
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environmental suitability maps to define at-risk 
populations for stage 1. Stage 2 is an adaptation of an 
existing risk framework, the Index for Risk Management 
(INFORM),44,45 and uses a composite indicator to assess 
variation in outbreak receptivity (ie, locations where 
continued transmission in people is more likely to occur) 
combined with stage 1 estimates to identify regions with 
the highest potential for localised outbreaks. For stage 3, 
we combine connectivity assessments, both at the local 
and international scale, with stage 2 to establish regions 
with the highest potential for widespread epidemics.
We assessed information at the second national 
administrative division (admin 2) as defined by the UN 
Food and Agriculture Organization.46 Following INFORM 
protocols, we normalised covariate factors and standardised 
to a 0–10 output, with 10 representing the worst outcome. 
Contingent on the potential for compensatory effects 
between factors, we used either geometric or arithmetic 
means when aggregating data, with each stage building 
on the previous stage. We established uncertainty by 
calculating 1000 draws, each using independent random 
draws for covariates with associated variance. We assessed 
uncertainty at each of the three stages. Aggregation of the 
results for all stages occurs after this process, ensuring a 
full record of the uncertainty by stage. Importantly, the 
output measures of median ranks allow for comparison, 
but are not direct representations of quantitative 
differences in potential case numbers and deaths.
This study follows the Guidelines for Accurate and 
Transparent Health Estimates Reporting (GATHER).47 
Further details on the estimation and data sources used 
in this analysis are included in the supplementary 
materials, and all code used for these analyses are 
available on request from the corresponding author.
Stage 1: assessing index-case potential based on 
environmental suitability
We used existing models of environmental suitability for 
the transmission of a virus from environmental sources 
into human populations to establish regions at risk 
of spillover infections.20,22,24,25,48 These maps use reported 
geographic information on index cases of outbreaks 
and viral detection in animals,21,23–25 which are related to 
environmental drivers using species distribution 
models.49,50 We compiled this information to build an 
environmental profile that best characterises possible 
pathogen presence. Subsequently, areas of unknown 
disease status can be evaluated based on their environ-
mental profile similarities. We calculated a data-driven 
threshold value defining at-risk areas by assessing 
different groupings of reported disease occurrences and 
background records, and the ability of each threshold to 
accurately classify them.51,52 This process was repeated 
1000 times. Total population count evaluated at a 5 × 5 km 
resolution,53 and the proportion of the total administrative 
unit population living within these locations, were 
aggregated to the admin 2 level46 and standardised on a 
scale of 0–10.44 We evaluated a final stage 1 value by 
calculating an inverted geometric mean of these 
two population measures.44 More detail on the conversion 
of these niche maps and quantification of populations at 
risk is provided in the supplementary materials.
Stage 2: quantifying outbreak potential
We paired stage 1 estimates of index-case potential 
with a composite indicator of measures termed outbreak 
receptivity (table) to produce admin 2 level outbreak 
potential assessments, identifying locations more 
likely to experience secondary human-to-human viral 
transmission. We established an initial set of measures, 
referred to here as factors, through expert consultation 
based on the INFORM study,44 and revised for relevance to 
infectious diseases through a meeting at UK Department 
for International Development. We identified factors and 
grouped them into five key components: governance,27–29,54 
communications,31–34 isolation,35,36 infrastructure,37,38 and 
health care,39–43 based on hypothesised similar effects on 
outbreaks. This outbreak receptivity indicator and its 
components are intended to reflect the susceptibility of a 
given location to continued transmission based on the 
resident population and existing response infrastructure. 
Thus, each included factor is a hypothesised correlate of 
continued secondary transmission.
Other factors such as access to personal protective 
equipment or number of isolation wards were considered, 
but were ultimately excluded because data at a continental 
scale were not available. We collected information on 
each factor at the highest possible spatial resolution and 
summarised data at the admin 2 level. We standardised 
inputs to a 0–10 scale, including normalisation where 
appropriate, using optimised Box-Cox transformations,55 
and input variation simulated by drawing values from 
uncertainty estimates or data time series (supplementary 
materials). We took 1000 draws for each admin 2 per 
factor and aggregated into respective components, and 
then the composite indicator (table). Initial aggregation 
For supplementary materials 
see http://ghdx.healthdata.org/
Figure 1: Conceptual progression of a viral haemorrhagic fever from animal reservoir to global pandemic
Keys stages in the progression to a potential widespread epidemic are summarised. Stage 1, index-case potential, 
refers to spillover viral transmission from animal reservoir to index cases. Stage 2, outbreak potential, represents 
an index case infecting individuals within the local community or in a care-giving setting quantified via a 
composite indicator assessing outbreak receptivity. Stage 3, epidemic potential, reflects the widespread 
transmission of the virus both at regional and international scales.
Viral transmission
Index caseReservoir host
Index-case potential
Human-to-human transmission
Outbreak potential Epidemic potential
1 2 3
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weighed components equally. In testing this composite 
indicator, we identified uniqueness among factors via 
principal components analysis, and removed redundant 
factors (ie, those with similar scores across the first two 
principal components).44 We calculated variance-based 
importance metrics for sensitivity to analyse unintentional 
dominance of any one component.56,57 Given that a subset 
of all possible outbreak drivers are used with no a priori 
rationale for one component being dominant, we 
enforced equivalence by reweighting the arithmetic mean 
so that the differences in variance explained of the final 
composite indicator by each component were reduced. 
We coupled the resultant outbreak receptivity values with 
stage 1 outputs for each pathogen by taking their 
geometric mean, to produce the final stage 2 evaluation.
Stage 3: estimating epidemic potential based on local 
and international connectivity
We evaluated two dimensions of epidemic potential for 
stage 3. First, we assessed the source capacity of an 
admin 2 unit (ie, the potential for an outbreak to seed 
infections in other locations) (stage 3a) by measuring 
the average travel time from a given 5 × 5 km unit in 
each admin 2 to the nearest city (defined as over 
50 000 inhabitants).36 With this calculation, we identified 
the at-risk locations most likely to be exporters of infected 
individuals, in the absence of barriers to movement such 
as border restrictions. The travel time covariate uses 
information on land cover and existing infrastructure to 
estimate the shortest travel time from any given point to 
nearby settlements. We normalised this covariate and 
standardised to a 0–10 scale, and the geometric mean 
of stage 2 outputs and this covariate were taken to 
produce the measure for stage 3a. Second, we assessed 
international source capacity (stage 3b) with anonymised 
passenger-level flight itineraries from the International 
Air Transport Association for 2015, which included 
details on passengers’ initial airport of embarkation and 
final destination.14,58 We produced the estimate for 
epidemic potential by pairing national patterns of 
outbound passenger volume to any other global 
destination, with stage 2 outputs using geometric means.
Role of the funding source
The funders of the study had no role in study design, 
data collection, data analysis, data interpretation, or 
writing of the report. The corresponding author had full 
access to all the data in the study and had final 
responsibility for the decision to submit for publication.
Results
Here, we provide estimates for each at-risk subnational 
admin 2 in Africa across the three stages of a potential 
outbreak (figure 2). Interactive maps are made available 
via online visualisation tools. 
Across Africa, the ranking of subnational regions in 
stage 1, identification of locations with the greatest 
potential for index cases, reflected key trends observed in 
the original zoonotic niche maps (figure 2, first row). All 
admin 2 areas are ordered so that regions with the highest 
index-case potential are highest ranked. Areas susceptible 
to spillover of Crimean–Congo haemorrhagic fever were 
widespread, with the highest ranked admin 2 units found 
in the Sahel (eg, Kollo, Niger), the Horn of Africa (eg, 
Resolution Data source
Stage 1 index case potential
Crimean–Congo haemorrhagic fever: environmental 
suitability
5 × 5 km Messina et al20
Crimean–Congo haemorrhagic fever: occurrence records Geopositioned 
records
Messina et al21
Ebola virus disease: environmental suitability 5 × 5 km Pigott et al22
Ebola virus disease: occurrence records Geopositioned 
records
Mylne et al23
Lassa fever: environmental suitability and occurrence records 5 × 5 km Mylne et al24
Marburg virus disease: environmental suitability and 
occurrence records
5 × 5 km Pigott et al25
Population 5 × 5 km WorldPop26
Stage 2 outbreak potential
Governance
Government effectiveness National World Bank27
Corruption perception index* National Transparency 
International28
Donor aid National IHME29
Conflict Subnational ACLED30
Communications
Educational attainment National IHME31
Internet National World Bank32
Cellular phone subscriptions National World Bank33
Electricity National World Bank34
Isolation
Proportion rural 5 × 5 km GRUMP35
Travel time to nearest major settlement 5 × 5 km Nelson36
Infrastructure
Access to improved water National and 
subnational
GAHI37 and IHME38
Access to improved sanitation National and 
subnational
GAHI37 and IHME38
Health care
DPT3 coverage National WHO39
Lower respiratory infections* National IHME40,41
Diarrhoeal disease* National IHME40,41
Health-care expenditure as a percentage of GDP National WHO42
Under-5 mortality 5 × 5 km Golding et al43
Stage 3 epidemic potential
Travel time to nearest major settlement 5 × 5 km Nelson36
Outbound passenger volume (flights) National IATA†
The table outlines covariates included for each stage, and their provenance. In stage 2, each component is broken down 
into its constituent factors: governance, communications, isolation, infrastructure, and health care. IHME=Institute for 
Health Metrics and Evaluation. ACLED=Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project. GAHI=Global Alliance for 
Humanitarian Innovation. GRUMP=Global Rural-Urban Mapping Project. DPT3=diphtheria-tetanus-pertussis. 
GDP=gross domestic product. IATA=International Air Transport Association. *Excluded after redundancy analysis. †Data 
not publicly available. 
Table: Input datasets used in the pandemic potential framework
For online visualisation tools 
see https://vizhub.healthdata.
org/geospatial/pandemics
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Figure 2: Pandemic potential of four African viral haemorrhagic fevers
Each column represents the various stages of a potential pandemic, from initial index-case potential (first row) and outbreak potential (second row) to local epidemic potential (third row) and global 
epidemic potential (fourth row). Columns, moving from left to right, show this progression for Crimean–Congo haemorrhagic fever, Ebola virus disease, Lassa fever, and Marburg virus disease. For each 
figure, administrative units coloured in red are those with median values (based on 1000 draws) that rank in the top quintile of ranked units; units in dark green have median values that rank in the 
lowest quintile. Interactive maps are available via the online visualisation tools.
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Sennar, Sudan), and southern Africa (eg, Johannesburg, 
South Africa). By contrast, Lassa fever was restricted to 
areas in western Africa such as in Guinea (eg, Guéckédou) 
and Nigeria (eg, Ife North), whereas Ebola virus disease 
had highest ranked admin 2 units, and thus those with the 
highest potential for index cases, found in both western 
Africa (eg, Macenta, Guinea and Foya, Liberia) and middle 
Africa (eg, Woleu, Gabon and Haut-Uele, the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo). Highest ranked locations for 
Marburg virus disease were present across the continent 
(eg, Mwenge, Uganda; Voinjama, Liberia; and Beni, the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo). Although many 
regions in the highest quintile were located in countries 
with previous outbreaks, several locations with no previous 
outbreaks had high index-case potential, such as Boumba-
et-Ngoko in Cameroon for Ebola virus disease (figure 3).
Outbreak receptivity, the composite indicator used in 
stage 2 to identify regions susceptible to ongoing sec-
ondary transmission, revealed substantial variation in 
capabilities to effectively respond to index cases (figure 4). 
At least 90% of the districts found in the Central African 
Republic, Chad, Somalia, and South Sudan ranked in 
Figure 3: Index-case potential across countries that did not previously report spillover events
Stage 1 index-case potential masked by previous reporting of index cases for Crimean–Congo haemorrhagic fever (A), Ebola virus disease (B), Lassa fever (C), 
and Marburg virus disease (D). Countries in dark grey are those that have previously seen spillover index cases reported. The remaining at-risk administrative units 
coloured in red are those with median values (based on 1000 draws) that rank in the top quintile of ranked remaining units; those coloured in green have median 
values that rank in the lowest quintile.
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the top 90th percentile of African locations, or in 
other words, those administrative units with the most 
susceptible populations and poorest response capacity. 
More than 80% of admin 2 units in Guinea, Madagascar, 
and Sudan were in the top 70th percentile or higher for 
outbreak receptivity.
Pairing outbreak receptivity (stage 2) with index-case 
potential (stage 1) highlights key differences in pathogen-
specific vulnerabilities between locations (figure 2, 
second row) which shows that some regions are more 
susceptible to continued human-to-human transmission. 
Locations rising up the rankings between stages indicate 
that, in the event of an index case, these would be 
key targets for rapid and effective intervention, to avert 
local outbreaks. For Crimean–Congo haemorrhagic 
fever, many at-risk districts increased in rankings, 
particularly in Somalia (54% increase in districts in top 
quintile admin 2) and across the Sahel, such as within 
Sudan (+25%) and Niger (+14%). Conversely, rankings 
decreased between stages in all districts in South Africa 
(85% reduction in top quintile admin 2) as well as parts of 
Kenya (–51%) and Tanzania (–29%). Similar patterns 
were observed with Ebola virus disease, with locations in 
Angola (+14%), the Central African Republic (+7%), and 
South Sudan (+7%) ranking higher, whereas districts in 
Côte d’Ivoire (–5%) and Uganda (–19%) decreased 
between stages. By contrast with Ebola virus disease, 
Lassa fever showed variable changes in ranking across 
western Africa; Guinean districts rose in ranking (+15%), 
Ivorian districts decreased (–28%), and Nigerian districts 
reflected the heterogeneities in receptivity found across 
the country. For Marburg virus disease, rankings rose 
most in at-risk districts in Angola (+13%) and the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (+21%), whereas 
similar national-level trends occurred in line with changes 
seen in Ebola virus disease rankings (eg, 35% reduction 
in top quintile admin 2 units in Uganda).
Travel time to nearest city in stage 3a revealed large 
variations in connectivity across Africa, contrasting the 
densely populated and urbanised regions in northern 
and western Africa with the Sahara and the rainforests 
of middle Africa. For instance, the isolation of forested 
areas in middle Africa contributed to substantial 
reductions in rankings (figure 2, third row, stage 3a), 
and suggest lower potential for a widespread outbreak 
of Crimean–Congo haemorrhagic fever, Ebola virus 
disease, or Marburg virus disease occurring in Congo 
(14% and 15% reduction in top quintile admin 2 for 
Ebola virus disease and Marburg virus disease), the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (–43% Crimean–
Congo haemorrhagic fever, –21% Ebola virus disease, 
–18% Marburg virus disease), and Gabon (–40% Ebola 
virus disease, –29% Marburg virus disease). Conversely, 
much of western Africa rose in the ranking for epidemic 
potential, particularly in Nigeria (+20% Crimean–Congo 
haemorrhagic fever, +29% Ebola virus disease, and 
+19% Marburg virus disease), Guinea (+28% Ebola virus 
disease, +27% Marburg virus disease), and Sierra Leone 
(+25% Ebola virus disease). A similar trend was seen for 
densely populated regions of eastern Africa, such as 
Uganda (+19% Ebola virus disease, +23% Marburg virus 
disease), indicating that these locations have a greater 
potential to spread to neighbouring areas. To that end, 
comparison of local outbreak potential with international 
spread capability also highlights important trends 
(figure 2, fourth row, stage 3b). For Crimean–Congo 
haemorrhagic fever, with only low rankings in 
receptivity, the potential for international spread was 
high for South Africa (81% increase in top quintile 
admin 2) and at-risk districts in Nigeria represented 
many of those with the highest potential for global 
spread (+30% Crimean–Congo haemorrhagic fever, 
+59% Ebola virus disease, +42% Marburg virus disease, 
+18% Lassa fever).
Discussion
We report large heterogeneities across Africa in potential 
for zoonotic spillover resulting in index cases and their 
subsequent potential to result in local outbreaks or 
spread to neighbouring districts or countries. Several 
locations rank highly for localised outbreaks, but are 
comparatively less likely to spread elsewhere due to their 
Figure 4: Outbreak receptivity
The map displays the final outbreak receptivity indicator, a component in the stage 2 evaluation. Administrative 
units coloured in red are those with median values (based on 1000 draws) that rank in the top quintile of ranked 
units; those in dark blue have median values that rank in the lowest quintile. Interactive maps are available via the 
online visualisation tools.
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isolation (eg, forests in middle Africa). Other locations, 
many in western Africa, rank highly both in terms of 
viral haemorrhagic fever outbreak potential and capacity 
to spread in the absence of effective interventions. 
Identification of regions with the greatest increases in 
rank between stages highlights key transition points in 
which interventions are crucial for preventing epidemics.
We hope this work can inform investments at each 
stage of potential epidemic progression: identification of 
regions requiring heightened surveillance in people and 
animals (stage 1) such as bat surveillance in Cameroon;59 
strengthening of core pandemic preparedness and 
response capacities (stage 2) by addressing weaknesses in 
health provisioning in Chad, Somalia, and South Sudan; 
and pre-emptive identification of places that are likely to be 
key distributors in any potential outbreak (stage 3) such as 
highly connected Nigerian and Ugandan admin 2 units. 
For stage 1, this assessment highlights the subnational 
variation that exists in at-risk populations, providing 
additional evidence concerning spillover potential in 
places that are considered non-endemic, such as Ebola 
virus disease in the Central African Republic. Proactive 
surveillance in animal populations can help these 
locations better evaluate emerging infectious disease 
threats. Additionally, highest ranked locations should be 
provisioned with the necessary diagnostic capacity to 
ensure timely and accurate diagnosis.
Stage 2, quantifying outbreak potential, provides a data-
informed framework for targeting where to focus resources 
for health-system strengthening. Coupling these with Joint 
External Evaluations to establish where there are unmet 
needs in outbreak response will identify key priorities for 
future investment. Ensuring health-care workers are aware 
of possible index-case presentation is an important first 
step in minimising the potential for nosocomial secondary 
spread.60 With candidate vaccines in development, these 
assessments can also inform where stockpiles might be 
most appropriate.61 Finally, stage 3, assessing the potential 
for further geographic spread, allows for an in-depth 
examination of where high connectivity could result in 
widespread infection and how to design interventions, 
such as ring vaccination,62 to halt continued transmission. 
Overlaying highly ranked locations identifies where these 
efforts could be most effective across a variety of scenarios 
(supplementary materials).
This framework is not dependent on there being 
an outbreak and can therefore support the proactive 
development of national and regional contingency plans by 
ministries of health and non-governmental organisations. 
Where vulnerabilities are identified, communities can 
appropriately prepare and rectify issues in advance. 
Understanding where potential outbreaks might occur 
and prospective transmission trajectories is an important 
step in establishing informed protocols for prevention and 
control. Indeed, even when cases occur, this framework 
combined with specific modelling strategies by stage and 
pathogen can inform focal control and response efforts. 
Aligning future priority pathogens with strategic 
investment in vaccine countermeasures targets (eg, Nipah 
virus) or other organisations’ aims, will maximise the 
value of these outputs.
It is important to consider the limitations of this 
approach. The geographic scope of currently measured 
factors and the need for their completeness necessitates 
the use of proxy covariate factors rather than specific 
drivers. Assuming that spillover potential scales with 
population, rather than explicit assessment of human-
animal interactions, was necessary since systematically 
collected data on these interactions and their relative 
frequencies were not available. Data gaps in emerging 
infectious disease epidemiology and transmission still 
remain, particularly regarding reservoirs. This flexible 
framework could, however, add new information such as 
quantitative measures of risk factors,63,64 or include 
alternative modelling approaches65 where appropriate, 
when such assessments become more geographically 
comprehensive. Importantly, uncertainty at all stages can 
be propagated and included in estimates. To maximise 
generalisability, we were unable to include some pathogen-
specific countermeasures. For instance, the high rankings 
of districts in Uganda and the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo do not account for historical viral haemorrhagic 
fever outbreaks in these locations23 and the sophisticated 
response systems now present, which will help offset 
some of the outbreak potential identified by this 
framework. Such response blueprints or experiences, 
however, can be referenced and replicated by other at-risk 
countries, including pre-emptive surveys of bat populations 
in Ghana,66 strategies to overcome logistical surveillance 
challenges used in Uganda,60 or recognition of where 
existing infrastructure could be co-opted, such as polio 
teams in Nigeria.67
Use of rankings versus absolute values meant that 
although comparative statements can be made, definitive 
statements of risk are harder. Given the evidence base 
currently available, we are able to identify potential 
spillover locations in a data-driven manner; however, such 
statements are not possible for stage 2 and 3 in the 
absence of more outbreak-specific information. For future 
iterations, parameterisation of outbreak receptivity using 
historical outbreaks could allow for this, and could also be 
used to weight the relative effect of factors. By leveraging 
the full history of outbreaks, these data will also provide a 
mechanism for formally validating the framework. When 
expanding to new regions, this ability to parameterise 
differences in factors will allow for regional variations to 
be considered. Rankings are also sensitive to estimated 
parameters such as the suitability thresholds defining risk 
at stage 1, which leads to inconsistent at-risk admin 2 level 
definitions based on varying thresholds (supplementary 
materials). Such variation is incorporated and reflected in 
broader uncertainty intervals. In spite of this fact, however, 
districts such as Guéckédou (the epicentre of the western 
African Ebola virus disease outbreak) remain in the 
Articles
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98th percentile of districts with high epidemic potential 
for Ebola virus disease, indicating that this approach 
can indeed provide valuable information on 
epidemic potential.
The appropriateness of factors in approximating for 
these processes is open to debate, as a trade-off between 
the geographic completeness and epidemiological 
relevance of data that was needed for inclusion. For 
instance, more appropriate proxies for local expenditure 
on health care beyond percentage of total gross domestic 
product could be leveraged as this information becomes 
increasingly available.68 Similarly, response time might not 
be solely dependent on travel infrastructure being present, 
but also its quality and year-round availability. With 
continued efforts to improve existing data resources or use 
geostatistical approaches to increase their spatial 
resolution,69,70 these improved covariates can all be included 
in future iterations. Increasing the number of subnational 
covariates will also result in greater variation between 
districts within a country (supplementary materials), and 
is therefore particularly important when considering using 
such approaches to evaluate heterogeneity within a specific 
country. Additional pathogens will require other covariates 
to be considered. For instance, existing niche mapping 
approaches have been restricted to those pathogens 
strongly affected by environmental factors, whereas 
additional pathogens will necessitate quantification of an 
increasing number of socioeconomic factors.71,72 The 
modular nature of this approach, however, allows for their 
inclusion should they become available.
Pathogens will continue to emerge and providing a 
rational and informed mechanism for the identification 
and prioritisation of regions for improvement and 
assistance across the world is therefore crucial. As 
demonstrated with African viral haemorrhagic fevers, this 
framework presents pandemic potential as distinct, yet 
interconnected stages, and allows for specific interventions 
to be tailored to locations where it is likely to have the 
greatest effect before the next epidemic. In moving to a 
more proactive consideration of these pathogens and 
regional variation in vulnerabilities, this analysis comple-
ments global health security ambitions and contributes to 
the larger discussion of where to focus limited resources in 
preparation for an epidemic of these rare, yet potentially 
devastating, pathogens.
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